Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 1 Well-Being:	What	Matters	Beyond	the	Mental?* Jennifer	Hawkins Most	philosophers	assume	that	more	matters	for	well-being-intrinsically- than simply mental states.1	Certain standard, and by now familiar, examples are thought	to	establish	this.	There	is	the	deceived	spouse	whose	happiness	depends	on belief	in	her	partner,2	or	the	man	who	is	secretly	despised	by	those	he	thinks	of	as friends,3	or the woman who dies believing falsely that she has succeeded in an important project.4	Probably the most famous example is provided by Nozick's experience	machine.5	We are invited to imagine the	most powerful virtual reality machine	possible,	one	that	could,	simply	by	stimulating	our	brain,	make	us	think	we were having any sort of experience. Like the individuals already mentioned, a person	living	inside	the	experience	machine	might	think	that	her life is	going	well, but	the	beliefs	upon	which	this	assessment	would	be	made	would	all	be	false.	In	all of	these	examples,	individuals	are	deluded	about	certain	important	aspects	of	their *	This article has been a long time in the making and I am grateful to many who offered helpful comments at the following conferences: 4th Annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (RoME), University of Colorado, Boulder, August 2011; Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Stirling, Scotland, July 2012; 4th Annual Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics, Tucson, Arizona, January 2013; Central Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, February 2013. In particular, I wish to thank Stephen Campbell and Howard Nye for extremely useful commentaries, and Shelly Kagan for helpful discussion at the Normative Ethics Workshop. 1 One recent example: In a brief discussion of Nozick's experience machine, Dan Haybron writes, "Apparently our mental states are not the only things that matter." Daniel M. Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3. The focus of this article is intrinsic welfare value. If not specified otherwise, that is what is meant. 2 Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics (Boulder, Co.:Westview Press, 1998), 36; L.W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 157; Russ Shafer-Landau, The Fundamentals of Ethics, 2nd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 34-5. Kagan builds all three of the standard types of example into one case of a man deceived about spouse, friends, and accomplishments. 3 Kagan, Normative Ethics, 36; T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 112; James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 19. 4 Kagan, Normative Ethics, 36; Shafer-Landau, Fundamentals, 52; Griffin, Well-Being, 23. Griffin gives an inverse example of accomplishment unknown (as opposed to belief in accomplishment when there is none). He remarks that if Bertrand Russell's work for nuclear disarmament had actually significantly reduced the chance of nuclear war, then this would be good for Russell even though he would never know it. 5 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 42-5 and The Examined Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 104-8. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 2 lives	(or, if they	are in the	experience	machine,	about	most	aspects	of their lives!), and	we	are	supposed	to	have	the	intuition	that	this	means	things	are	going	badly	for them. Not only is there broad consensus that such examples undermine state-ofmind	theories	of	well-being,	but	there	appears	as	well	to	be	a	consensus	that	desirefulfillment theories (whatever else one	may think	of them)	handle	well the extramental dimension of well-being.6	The problem that state-of-mind theories face is one	desire	theories	can	solve. However, there is an important distinction that is routinely overlooked in these	discussions	and	which	may	make	a	difference	to	our	sense	of	how	well	desire theories	handle things	beyond the	mental.	When it is said that	more	matters than mental states, this could	mean that certain	mind-independent	events count	when it comes	to	assessing	how	good	my	life	is,	whether	I	know	about	them	or	not.	Call	this the "mind-independent events matter" thesis (MIE). MIE is central to desire theories.7	On	such	views,	there	is	nothing	more	to	desire	satisfaction	or	frustration than an event in the world. The theory treats desire as an attitude towards a possible	state	of	affairs	that	is	satisfied	if	and	only	if	that	state	of	affairs	comes	to	be. Thus, 'desire satisfaction' has	nothing to	do	with	personal or felt satisfaction and, more	importantly,	nothing	to	do	with	knowledge	that	the	event	occurred. Alternatively,	the	idea	that	more	matters	than	mental	states	could	mean	that it is important to have a connection with reality. Call this the "positive value of knowledge	thesis"	(PVK).	Rather	than	place	value	on	an	event	by	itself,	PVK	places value	on	knowledge, i.e.	on the	obtaining	of	a	certain	relation	between	events	and 6 Griffin, Well-Being, 9-10; Kagan, Normative Ethics, 36; Roger Crisp, "Well-Being," in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/well-being/, 9. 7 Desire theories go beyond the mental by incorporating MIE, but they are not the only theories to do so. For example, L. W. Sumner thinks that well-being requires what he calls "authentic happiness." Happiness is a purely psychological state, one that combines an attitude of satisfaction with one's life and good affect. Happiness is authentic if it is (a) informed and (b) based on authentic values. However, both (a) and (b) are given counterfactual interpretations, such that happiness is informed as long as it would not be undermined by gaining information, and values are authentic as long as they would not be undermined by awareness of their origins. Only the information requirement is relevant here. Because the information condition is counterfactual, there is no requirement that I actually know something in order for it to make a difference to my level of welfare. This is a version of MIE. See Sumner, Welfare, ch.6. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 3 the	mind.8	In	this	context,	I	intend	'knowledge'	to	mean	knowledge	of	the	significant facts about one's self and one's life, not knowledge generally. Desire theories can only indirectly accommodate the thought that a connection with reality is important,	namely	by	allowing	that	knowledge	counts	when	individuals	desire	it. Interestingly,	no	doubt	because	the	distinction	between	MIE	and	PVK	is	not usually made, no one seems to have noticed that the standard examples are ambiguous in	the	sense	that	the intuitions	called	forth	could just	as	easily	support the value	of knowedge (PVK)	or the value	of events (MIE). Consider the	deceived individuals	mentioned	above.	We	might feel that the lives	of these individuals	are bad	because	their	lives	are	so	very	different	from	what	they	objectively	want	them to	be.	Or	we	might	think	their	lives	are	bad	because	they	are	so	ignorant	about	their lives. Or our intuitions might be tracking both. The same holds for Nozick's experience	machine case.	Nozick's own	presentation seems to emphasize the idea that	subjects	in	the	machine	lack	all	connection	with	reality.	But	it	is	also	true	that their	lives	are	objectively	very	different	from	what	they	probably	want	them	to	be. In desire satisfaction terms, most desires of a person in the experience machine would	be	frustrated,	though	the	person	would	not	know	this.	If	we	are	troubled	by the	experience	machine,	are	we	troubled	by	ignorance,	desire	frustration,	or	both? The	easiest	way	to	see	just	how	different	MIE	and	PVK	are	is	to	think	about how	they	might	come	apart.	And	the	easiest	way	to	do	this is	to	consider	how-in certain	types	of	cases-they	would	rank	possible	lives. Consider	the	following	four	cases	and	assume	they	occur	within	lives	that	are otherwise identical to	one another (so that any	differences in the ranking	of lives must	be	attributable	to	the	differences	recorded	here): Case	1:	My	desire	for	X	is	satisfied	and	I	know	this. Case	2:	My	desire	for	X	is	frustrated	and	I	know	this. 8 It is actually unclear whether knowledge is valuable or one of its epistemic relatives, such as justified true belief. I consider these matters later in the article. For simplicity now I will just talk about knowledge. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 4 Case	3:	My	desire	for	X	is	frustrated	and	I	don't	know	this. Case	4:	My	desire	for	X	is	satisfied	and	I	don't	know	this. Desire theory always places value on the satisfaction of desire. But it only places value on knowledge if the individual (actually or hypothetically) desires knowledge.9	To	make	the	contrast	as	clear	as	possible,	consider	a	person	who	lacks any	desire	(actual	or	hypothetical)	to	know	how	things	stand.	In	such	a	case,	desire theory treats 1 and 4 as equivalent and as superior to either 2 or 3. However, a theory	that incorporated	only	PVK-the	idea	that	knowledge	matters-would	rank the	same	lives	quite	differently.	It	would	treat	1	and	2	as	equivalent	and	as	superior to	either	3	or	4.	Clearly	there	is	more	than	one	way	to	go	beyond	the	mental.10 I have three goals for this paper. First, I aim to convince people of the importance	of	the	distinction	between	MIE	and	PVK.11	Whatever	else	one	concludes about	things	beyond	the	mental,	I	hope	in	the	future	that	theorists	of	well-being	will no longer	consider it sufficient to	say	simply, "I	accept the	conclusions	of	Nozick's experience machine: there are non-mental components of well-being." One must also say which extra-mental things or relations have intrinsic welfare value, and whether	they	always	have	it	or	only	sometimes	do. Second,	I	want	to	raise	doubts	about	the	way	current	desire	theories	handle this	issue.	There	are	several	worries	one	might	have	in	this	regard.	First,	one	might think	that	events	have	no	intrinsic	welfare	value	apart	from	our	knowledge	of	them. 9 An actual desire theory equates a person's good with what she actually desires. There are relatively few defenders of actual desire theories, though an exception is Mark Murphy, "The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory," Nous 33: 2: (1999): 247-72. Informed desire theories, on the other hand, equate a person's good with what she would desire if she were fully informed and rational. See for example, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-416 and Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review 95: 2: (1986):163-207 and "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14: 2: (1986): 5-31. For my purposes here, the differences between actual and informed theories are of little relevance. So I shall simply discuss desire theories and assume that readers can work out for themselves how particular points would apply to each kind of desire theorist. 10 Indeed, there are really many ways to go beyond the mental. As we shall see, there are numerous variations on MIE and PVK. I begin with MIE and PVK because they are the two most obvious theses to suggest themselves on the basis of the traditional examples. 11 And between their relatives. See previous note. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 5 If so, then MIE is false and desire theory runs into trouble because of its incorporation of MIE. Second, one might worry (or worry instead) about desire theory's account of the value of personal life knowledge. There are, in turn, two ways	such	worries	might	go.	There	might	be	cases	where, intuitively,	personal life knowledge	seems	like	a	great	benefit	but	where	the	individual	in	question	does	not desire it, and so desire theory claims it is not good. Less often recognized is the alternative problem, where, intuitively, personal life knowledge seems nonbeneficial	but	where	the	person	in	question	does	desire	it	and	so	the	theory	claims	it is	good. Finally, I	want to	begin to	work	out the implications for the theory	of	wellbeing	of	adopting	or	rejecting	various	different	claims	(or	combinations	of	claims) about	what	matters	beyond	the	mental.	If	one	is	bothered	by	any	one	of	the	points raised above, then the question naturally arises: what should a theorist of wellbeing	say	about	these	matters?	Can	a	desire	theorist	revise	the	theory	in	some	way to meet these concerns, or is there another subjective theory-a near cousin of desire	theory	perhaps-that	might	do	so	and	might	be	preferrable	for	that	reason? Or shall	we	discover that the intuitions	appealed to	here	ultimately support some kind	of	objective	theory?	I	shall	first	consider	these	questions	in	relation	to	MIE,	and then in the second half of the paper turn to considering PVK and its relatives. However,	given	that	this	is largely	uncharted	territory	and	given	the	complexity	of the	issues,	I	shall	not	try	to	reach	definitive	answers	here,	but	merely	try	to	suggest which	are	the	most	promising	avenues	for	further	reflection. §1.0 Are	the	Limits	of	Well-Being	the	Limits	of	the	Person? I	wish	to	begin	by	looking	briefly	at	an	argument	of	Shelly	Kagan's.	There	are	several reasons	why	it	makes	sense	to	begin	with	Kagan.	First, if	his	argument	succeeds it would entail either that very little beyond the mental affects well-being, or that nothing beyond the mental does. Before going further then, we need to assure Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 6 ourselves	that	it	is	possible	to	escape	his	conclusion.	Second,	it	is	useful	to	see	how philosophical	thinking	about	the	extra-mental	aspects	of	well-being	has	been	shaped by	exclusive	focus	on	MIE.	Kagan's	discussion	provides	an	illustration. Kagan	states the	conclusion	of	his	argument	as "the limits	of	well-being	are the limits of the individual." However, this needs some explanation.	What Kagan means	is	that	facts	about	well-being	are	limited	to	fact	about	an	indiviudal's	mind	or body.12	Now	it	might	seem	odd	to	include	facts	about	the	body,	but	this	flows	from Kagan's	thought	that	facts	about	well-being	must	be	limited	to	facts	about	a	person's non-relational properties. Which non-relational properties ultimately count depends	on	what	beings	like	us	essentially	are.	If	we	are	essentially	minds,	then	wellbeing depends entirely on non-relational mental facts. If, however, our essence includes our bodies, then our well-being could include non-relational facts about our	bodies	as	well. Kagan reports being sympathetic to the idea that our essence includes our bodies.	If	that	is	right,	and	bodily	facts	count,	then	obviously	something	beyond	the mental matters for well-being. However, even if one were to accept that idea, Kagan's	conclusion,	though	not	strictly	ruling	out	things	beyond	the	mental,	would still	be	a	radical	departure	from	the	kind	of	view	endorsed	by	desire	theorists	who embrace	MIE. Traditionally, such theorists have been interested in defending the idea	that	the	kinds	of	extra-mental	facts	picked	out	by	our	evaluative	attitudes	affect our welfare. Most of these facts are neither mental nor bodily. However, it is important	not to	get too	distracted	by the	question	of the	essence	of	persons.	For whichever	of	these	two	claims	one	finds	plausible,	the	real	philosophical	work	(from the perspective of one interested in the topics of this paper) is done by Kagan's claim	that	changes	in	merely	relational	properties	cannot	affect	well-being.	It	is	this claim that rules out as relevant	most of the facts traditionally defended	by	desire theorists	as	well	as	the	kinds	of	facts	a	defender	of	PVK	might	want	to	include. 12 Shelly Kagan, "The Limits of Well-Being," in The Good Life and the Human Good, eds. E. L. Paul, F. D. Miller, and J. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 169-89. Also see Shelly Kagan, "Me and My Life," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 94: (1994): 309-24. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 7 Kagan's	argument	for	the	radical	conclusion	turns	on	the	notion	of	benefit.	He claims, plausibly enough, that a theory of well-being must do more than simply capture the idea of value connected to, or associated	with, an individual. It	must capture	value	for	the	individual.	If	my	well-being	improves,	it	must	be	obvious	how this	benefits	me.	But	Kagan	also	thinks	that	the	connection	with	benefit	can	only	be obvious if I am directly affected in some way. He thus assumes that a change in purely	relational	properties	could	not	constitute	a	benefit.	The	argument	goes like this: 1. Positive	changes	in	well-being	are	benefits. 2. Benefits	must	involve	changes	in	the	person	benefited,	i.e.	changes	in	her non-relational	properties. 3. A	person	is	no	more	than	her	mind	and	her	body. ______________________________________________________ (C)	Therefore,	positive	changes	in	well-being	must	be	changes	in	the non-relational	properties	of	the	person's	body	or	mind	or	both.13 This	argument	can	be	difficult to	assess initially,	because	so	much turns	on the extent to which one finds each premise intuitive, and this in turn seems to depend	largely	on	the	kinds	of	cases	one	thinks	about. In	particular, it	depends	on the	extent	to	which	one	is	focused	on	MIE.	It	is	both	interesting	and	important	that in	his	discussion	leading	up	to	this	argument,	Kagan	rehearses	a	very	familiar	story about	the	development	of	philosophical	theories	of	well-being.	Hedonism,	the	story goes,	was	ultimately	replaced	by	desire	theory,	in	part	because	hedonism	could	not capture our sense that more matters than just mental states. Desire theory, whatever	its	other	flaws,	seems	able	to	handle	this	well,	because	the	satisfaction	of desire	requires	that	the	world	be	a	certain	way.	The	fact	that	Kagan	rehearses	this particular	history	leading	up	to	his	argument,	suggests	that	he	is	focused	on	MIE	as 13 Of course, Kagan can run the same kind of argument in negative terms to explain why something cannot reduce well-being unless it directly affects a person in a negative way. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 8 opposed	to	PVK	when	he	makes	his	argument.	There	is	certainly	nothing	in	anything Kagan	says	to	suggest	PVK	as	an	alternative	thesis	about	what	matters	beyond	the mental. And of course, whatever the truth of the	matter about Kagan's focus, his rehearsal	of	this	development	makes	it	natural	for	readers	to	focus	on	MIE. This is significant, especially if other people's intuitions follow	mine, for I certainly	find	premise	(2)	more	plausible	if	I	am	focused	on	particular	implications of	MIE. Suppose that A very	much	wants some event, E, to occur. In story one it occurs.	In	story	two	it	doesn't.	But	in	neither	story	does	A	ever	learn	what	happens with	respect	to	E.	Desire	theory	claims	that	she	is	much	better	off	in	story	one.	But	it is	not too	hard	to	understand	the	perspective	of	someone	who finds this	puzzling. To	push	the	point	a	little	further	and	establish	the	link	with	benefit,	imagine	that	in story	number	one	I	am	the	person	who	satisfies	A's	desire.	Moreover,	I	know	I	am satisfying	her	desire.	However, it is	still true that	she	will	never learn	what I	have done,	and	I	know	she	will	never	learn	this.	It	certainly	can	seem	very	odd	to	describe this	as	a	case	where	I	benefit	her.	In	short,	the	thought	that	benefit	might	require	a change in non-relational properties [as premise (2) claims] may seem more attractive	if	one	has	been	thinking	about	cases	where	no	such	change	has	occurred, and	where	benefit	also	seems	absent	or	at	least	highly	questionable.	But	as	soon	as one shifts one's attention to other types of cases and other potentially welfare enhancing	relations	(knowledge,	for	example)	it	is	less	clear	that	benefit	is	lacking. At	any	rate,	given	the	variety	of	relations	that	might	be	thought	to	matter	for	wellbeing	and	the	complexity	and	murkiness	of	the	intuitions	in	this	area,	I	see	no	need to	treat	Kagan's	argument	as	decisive. §2.0	Do	Events	Have	Prudential	Value	Apart	from	Knowledge? As we have seen, desire theory incorporates MIE-the thesis that certain mind independent facts	or	events	have	prudential	significance in	and	of themselves	and Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 9 independently	of	whether	the	subject	knows	them.	Yet,	as	we	have	also	seen,	some of	its	implications	can	be	highly	counterintuitive. The	kinds	of cases that test	MIE are like (3) and (4) in	our earlier ranking exercise.	In	(3)	I	desire	X,	my	desire	is	frustrated,	but	I	never	learn	this	fact.	In	(4)	I desire	X,	my	desire is satisfied,	but I	never learn this fact.	A	desire theory tells	us that	(3)	is	better	for	me	than	(4).	Suppose	I	have	dedicated	myself	to	bringing	up	my children, and define	myself in terms of	my parenting skills. Of course, I	want	my children to do well for whatever reason. But I also want it to be true that my parenting	makes	a	large	contribution	to	their	flourishing.	I	would	be	disappointed	if I discovered that	my parenting caused them to fare poorly or even if it	made no difference	at	all.	Suppose	my	children	do	fare	well	largely	because	of	my	parenting, but they live far away and for one reason or another, it is not possible for	me to know	how	their	lives	are	going.	My	desire	is	satisfied	though	I	never	know	it. Various things seem unobjectionably true in this case. Certain counterfactuals are true: namely, that if I knew I would be pleased, and if the opposite	had	been	true	I	would	have	been	disappointed.	Certain	evaluative	facts	are also	true:	It	is	certainly	good	for	my	children	that	they	flourish.	It	may	also	be	good for others who rely on them or who care about them and who (unlike me) can regularly	benefit from	seeing	how	well they	do.	But it	seems	strange	to	say that it benefits	me. This	is	not	just	a	hedonistic	intuition.	I	feel	no	inclination	to	say	that	facts	can benefit	me	only	by	changing	how	I	feel.	Moreover,	in	other	cases	where	I	know	how things stand in the world, it seems that the facts are the locus of value, and	my mental	state	important	only	because	it	is	my	mode	of	access	to	that	value.	Suppose	I accomplish	a	goal (I run	a	marathon)	and	know	this.	Given that I	wanted to	run	a marathon	it	now	seems	that	what	matters	(what	contributes	value	to	my	life)	is	the fact	that	I	succeeded	in	running	one. This suggests the following alternative to MIE. Certain events (whether picked	out as relevant	by	desires	or	picked	out as relevant in some	other	way	by Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 10 some	other theory	of	well-being)	have the	potential to	affect	welfare	positively	or negatively. But their ability to actually affect	welfare is conditional. Only if I have knowledge	about	these	facts	can	their	value	enter	my	life.	If	I	have	false	beliefs	or	no beliefs	about	X	then	the	facts	about	X	cannot	contribute	to	my	welfare.	It	is	not,	as	a hedonist	would insist, that only experiences possess intrinsic value.	On this view, facts	external	to	the	mind	have	intrinsic	welfare	value.	But	they	only	have	it	if	they are	mentally	grasped.	Call	this	the	conditional	value	of	events	thesis	or	CVE. CVE	is	not	the	same	as	PVK-the	thesis	I	originally	contrasted	with	MIE	and which	I	discuss	next.	To	see	the	difference	compare	the	following	three	claims: (1)	An	event,	E,	can	contribute	to	A's	welfare	(positively	or	negatively) independently	of	whether	A	knows	E. (MIE) (2)	An	event,	E,	can	contribute	to	A's	welfare	(positively	or	negatively)	only	if A knows	E. (CVE) (3)	Knowing	E	contributes	positively	to	A's	welfare. (PVK) CVE	says	that	potential	value	can	only	be	realized	when	there	is	a	positive	epistemic link.	But	the	nature	of	the	value	depends	on	the	nature	of	the	facts.	In	some	cases,	if the	facts	are	negative	(e.g.	I	learn	about	a	desire	frustration)	the	welfare	impact	will be negative. In other cases it	will be positive.	Moreover, CVE does not imply that more	true	beliefs	are	better	than	fewer.	CVE	places	intrinsic	value	on	events	or	facts in	the	world	and	makes	an	epistemic	relation	the	condition	for	the	realization	of	this value.	PVK,	on	the	other	hand,	assigns	intrinsic	value	to	a	positive	epistemic	relation in itself. PVK	does imply that	more true	beliefs are	better, as each	additional true belief	contributes	something	positive	to	welfare	regardless	of	the	what	the	belief	is about. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 11 What	merits	does	CVE	have?	There	are	certainly	some	things	to	be	said	in	its favor.	Many	people	who reject experience	machines feel that	welfare value lies in real	world	happenings. If I climb	Mount	Everest, it is the fact that I really	did this and	not	simply	the	fact	that	I	think	I	did	it	that	matters.	Nozick	is	persuasive	when he says, "we	want to	do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing them."14	CVE allows facts to play a role in	many cases, but eliminates the bizarre cases	where	facts	I	never	encounter	nonetheless	make	my	life	much	better	or	much worse	that	I	think	it	is. This	view	also	rids	the	desire	theory	of the	desires	of the	dead	(which	only some	will see as an advantage). If the satisfaction of	my desire only benefits	me when	I	know	about	it,	then	obviously	it	can't	benefit	me	once	I	am	beyond	the	point of having epistemic relations. I have never felt any temptation to think we can benefit	the	dead	in	the	welfare	sense,	so	this	seems	like	an	improvement	in	desire theory	from	my	perspective,	but	it	will	not	seem	so	to	everyone. More problematically, the view gives us a motive not to learn certain unpleasant truths. If the negative value of negative events can only enter	my life when	I	know	about	them,	then	it	seems	I	should	try	not	to	discover	these	facts.	I	am not sure what to make of this aspect of the view. At least two points are worth considering here. First, the counterintuitive implications mainly concern third parties-people	who	are	in	the	position	to	either	hide	or	share	information	with	us. But	it	does	not	give	the	subject	any	obvious	motivations	one	way	or	the	other.	This is because in real life we don't have much direct control over what we learn. Moreover,	we	don't know	whether something	we care about	will turn	out	well or badly	until	we	do	know,	at	whichpoint	the	damage-if	it	is	damage--is	done.	The	only sure	way	to	avoid	learning	negative	facts	would	be	to	try	to	avoid	learning	anything. Since on CVE this would typically deprive a person of as	many	welfare goods as welfare	bads,	this	hardly	seems	like	a	promising	strategy. 14 Nozick, Anarchy, 43. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 12 Second,	and	more	importantly,	if	one	combines	CVE	with	another	thesis	such as PVK, whatever residual problem remains would be largely resolved. For then learning	something	bad	would	be,	at	one	and	the	same	time,	a	welfare	good	and	a welfare bad (which actually seems right).	Whether it is	overall beneficial to learn some	fact	will	vary	from	case	to	case,	depending	on	how	bad	the	news	is,	how	this compares	to	the	positive	value	of	true	belief,	and	also	what	the	psychological	effects of	learning	the	bad	news	will be. Let	us	now	briefly	consider	what	objective	theories	say	about	MIE.	Is	it	part of	an	objective	theory	to	claim	that	extra-mental	facts,	of	which	we	remain	forever ignorant,	nonetheless	affect	our	welfare?	The	answer	is	not	obvious.	Desire	theorists use an individual's desires to pick out a set of facts in the	world that are	welfare affecting.	Given	that	desires	can	range	over	many	things, it is	possible for	many	of the facts selected to be at some remove from the subject whose well-being is in question,	and	so	the	issue	of	whether	these	facts	still	count	when	not	known	arises quite	naturally.	It	is	more	common,	however,	for	objective	list	theorists	to	focus	on identifying	the	most	significant	life	goods,	and	to	then	talk	about	how	subjects	need to have or possess these goods. The very terminology of 'having' or 'possessing' suggests a	much tighter relationship between the subject and	her putative goods, and	so	one	might	wonder	whether	the	issue	of	having	a	good	but	not	knowing	about it	even	arises. Nonetheless,	some	objective	theorists	are	probably	committed	to	MIE.	Take for	example	the	claim	that	health	is	an	objective	good.	Many	objective	theorists	have been	drawn to this claim.	To take it seriously (as	opposed to	saying that	health is instrumental in the	production	of	other intrinsic goods) is to leave room for facts that	might	not	be	known.	A	person	can	have	a	disease	and	fail	to	know	it.	Indeed,	she might	have	it for	some	time	without	having	any	symptoms.	In	most	cases,	at	some point, the disease	will affect her and she	will become aware of it. But if it is the disease	iself	that	counts	as	intrinsically	bad,	then	the	subject	can	fail	to	know	about one	of	the	things	directly	affecting	her	well-being.	It	is	possible	that	she	might	never Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 13 know,	if	she	dies	in	some	accident	before	her	illness	becomes	manifest.	This	seems to	me	analogous	to	the	desire	theorists	claim	that	a	desire	frustration	never	known about	nonetheless	makes	one's	life	worse. Just as I find	MIE implausible in the desire theory, I find it implausible in objective theories. Better to say that health is an extremely valuable all-purpose instrumental good. It contributes to things that matter intrinsically such as our ability	to	pursue	our	goals,	enjoy	our	relationships	etc.	etc.	But	it	is	these	things	that matter,	and	they	matter	when	we	know	about	them. Recently, some theorists with objectivist leanings have defended hybrid views	according	to	which	well-being	is	enjoying	the	good.15	On	these	accounts,	there are	certain	objectively	valuable	things.	Insofar	as	positive	welfare	value	enters	a	life it is	only	because	of	these.	But	for	that	value	to	enter	a	person's life	the	individual herself	must appreciate, love, or enjoy the thing in question. Interestingly, loving something or appreciating it presuppose knowing about it. If that's correct, then these	hybrid	views	seem	not	to	embrace	MIE,	but	rather	something	more	like	CVE. I	have	argued	that	MIE	has	some	strongly	counter-intuitive	results	and	have introduced	CVE	as	an	alternative.	How	appealing theorists find	CVE	remains to	be seen.	I	myself	am	undecided	about	its	merits. However,	there	is	nothing	in	principle to	stop	either	a	desire	theorist	or	an	objective	theorist	from	adopting	CVE.	In	order to	avoid	some	conterintuitive	implications	of	CVE,	however,	theorists	may	also	want to	adopt	PVK	or	one	of	its	cousins.	And	as	we	shall	see,	that	may	pose	a	problem	for desire	theorists	in	particular,	and	subjectivists	more	generally. §3.0 Is	it	Prudentially	Good	to	Have	an	Accurate	Picture	of	One's	Life? 15 Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 83-101; Shelly Kagan, "Well-Being as Enjoying the Good," in "Philosophical Perspectives," suppl., Nous 23: (2009): 25372; Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 73– 104. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 14 I	now	consider	PVK-the thesis that	personal life	knowledge	has intrinsic	welfare value. A familiar tradition in moral philosophy assigns value to knowledge in general,	with	a	special	emphasis	on	theoretical	knowledge.	Knowledge	in	this	sense appears on lists of objective goods, alongside	pleasure, virtue, the appreciation of beauty, and loving relationships.16	However, my concern is not with theoretical knowledge,	but	with	personal	knowedge. I	wonder	whether it is	good	for	a	person (at least	usually) to	be epistemically in touch	with the reality	of	her life. Personal knowledge is what deceived spouses and experience machine inhabitants lack. However,	the	scope	of	personal	knowledge	is	much	broader	than	simply	knowledge of	the	status	of	one's	desires,	though	it	presumably	includes	that.	Suppose	I	desire	a loving relationship with my sister. My desire is satisfied if we have a loving relationship. But having robust knowledge about my own life requires knowing more than just the fact that	we have such a relationship. It requires that I know quite	a	bit	about	my	sister,	that	I	remember	a	good	many	of	the	things	we	have	done together,	and	so	on	and	so	forth. PVK	seems initially	quite	plausible.	For	example, it	does	seem important to know	whether	those	who	act lovingly	towards	you,	really	do love	you. If	you	have children	that	you	love,	it	seems	important	to	know	this	fact	and	to	know	them	in	the sense	of	knowing	and	appreciating	many	significant	things	about	them.	If	I	develop dementia late in life and forget	my children,	my life seems	worse	because	of this, even	if	I	do	not	realize	I	have	forgotten	and	so	feel	no	regret.	The	loss	of	memory	in such cases, and the loss of personal knowledge it entails, are prudential bads because	they	cut	one	off	from	the	reality	of	one's	life.	It	does	seem	that	part	of	what 16 Probably the most famous historical example is Book X of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Theorists such as G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903) and W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930) thought of knowledge as having objective intrinsic value, though they did not recognize welfare value (goodness for a person) as a distinct value category. A contemporary defender of this view is Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). A contemporary objective theorist of welfare who assigns intrinsic value to knowledge is John Finnis, Natural Rights and Natural Law, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Richard Kraut, What is Good and Why: An Ethics of Well-Being (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), argues that there is objective intrinsic welfare value in enjoying the acquisition of knowledge. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 15 bothers people about experience	machine cases is the fact that the subject in the machine	is	so	deceived	about	the	real	conditions	of	her	life. Problems emerge, however, if one is inclined, as I am, in the direction of subjectivist theories of well-being. Desire theories claim that knowledge (of whatever sort, personal	or	otherwise) is	only	valuable if the subject	desires it.	To alter desire theory to accommodate PVK	might reasonably be thought to conflict with	the	basic	motives	that	drive	subjective	theories.	Above	all,	subjective	theories aim to avoid directly stipulating what is prudentially valuable. They prefer, whenever possible, to let substantive values emerge from individual attitudes. Objective	theories	have	no	problem	with	PVK,	and	for	that	reason	some	will	prefer to	incorporate	what	I	say	about	PVK	into	an	objective	theory.	But	objective	theories have	other	problems	at	the	metaethical	level.	So	there	is	a	real	question	about	how best to square the initial plausibility of PVK with a plausible overall theory of welfare. Before	turning	to	a	consideration	of	these	matters,	I	will	first	refine	the	thesis a	bit in the	hope	of identifying its	most	plausible form. PVK is	not really a single thesis, but a placeholder for a large set of claims one might defend about how standing in a certain epistemic relation (but	which one?) to objective facts in the world (but	which facts?) can have prudential value.17	Thus two issues need to be addressed.	First,	which	facts	intuitively	count	as	significant	life	facts?	If	it	turns	out to	be	true	that	we	benefit	prudentially from	standing in	some	particular	epistemic relation to significant life facts, which facts will these be? Second, is it really knowledge of these facts that matters or might some other, less demanding epistemic relation-such as true belief or justified true belief-have just as	much prudential	value? 17 There may also be other kinds of relations that matter-e. g. agential relations for example. Something like this is suggested by Nozick, Examined Life, 106. For now I have simply assumed that such matters could be captured in a discussion of the kinds of extra-mental facts that matter, i.e. if it matters that you climb Mt. Everest, then welfare would be enhanced only if you actually climb Mt. Everest. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 16 §3.1 What	Are	the	Significant	Life	Facts? Can	we	say	more	precisely	what	the	significant	facts	of	a	life	are?	How	do	we	know when	a	person	qualifies	as	having	significant	life	knowledge? It is	easy	to	think	of intuitively	important	categories	of life	knowledge,	such as knowledge of what one has done, and knowledge of the people in one's life. However,	even	though	we	can	identify	categories,	we	should	not	assume	individuals need	to	know	all	or	even	most	of	what	can	be	known	in	each	category.	Assuming	we select	the	categories	appropriately,	then	if	an	individual	failed	to	know	anything	in	a category,	we	would	think	she	had	a	serious	gap	in	her	life	knowledge.	But	it	remains open	how	much	detail	individuals	must	grasp	within	particular	categories. For example, it seems important to know the various things that you	have done	in	your	life	and,	if	you	acted	for	a	conscious	reason,	why	you	did	what	you	did. Yet	we	all	forget	many	of	the	details	of	our	lives,	and	while	some	of	this	loss	might also	be	a	prudential	loss,	surely	not	all	of	it	is.	When	I	try	to	remember	most	years	of my	life	I	quickly	generate	a	short	list	of	significant	events,	and	around	each	item	on the list a thick	web	of	particular	memories.	My	memories	of these	particulars are dense.	Yet	it	is	still	true	that	I	cannot	say	what	I	did	during	most	of	the	days	in	any given	year	of	my	life.	Would	I	be	significantly	better	off	if	I	suddenly	remembered	all of	those	details?	I	doubt	it. Although	it	can	seem	maddeningly	imprecise, it	seems	intuitively	right	that, in	order	to	count	as	knowing	the	significant	facts	of	our	own	lives	we	need	to	know (a)	the	big	things	we	have	done	or	that	have	happened	to	us-the	actions	and	events which have pushed our lives in particular directions, and (b) a large number of lesser	actions	and	events.	We	need	(b)	in	order	to	have	a	sense	of	the	texture	of	our lives,	in	order	to	fill	in	the	gaps	between	the	'big'	events.	But	insofar	as	these	"fill-in" events	are	the	ones	that	have	had	less	of	an	impact	on	the	shape	of	the	whole,	it	is less important which specific events a person knows. For example, I would be missing an important chunk of	my life if I	were to forget that I	went to graduate Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 17 school in philosophy. But if I only remember that I went to graduate school for philosophy,	but	remember	almost	nothing	from	that	time	period,	this	seems	a	lack	as well. I need, in addition, a fairly hefty collection of	memories from that time that help me to relate it to other times in my life. However, the particular events I remember	from	then	will	only	be	a	subset	of	all	the	events	that	happened.	Arguably, as	long	as	the	set	remembered	is	large	enough,	it	shouldn't	matter	which	particular things I remember. For each person and for each significant category of life knowledge there are presumably many sub-sets of true propositions from that category all of which cross the quantitative threshold for adequate "fill in" knowledge.	My	suggestion	is	that	knowing	the	propositions	in	any	one	of	these	sets is	sufficient	to	count	as	having	significant	life	knowledge. It	also	seems	plausible	that	we	must	know	something	about	the	people	in	our lives, at least those who have played a significant role. Moreover, the larger a person's role, the	more	we	must know about her and our relations	with her.	We must	not	only	know	facts	about	the	person,	but	have	a	roughly	correct	sense	of	the course	our relationship	with	her	has taken, including awareness	of	what	we	have sought	from	the	relationship,	the	impact	our	actions	have	had	on	her,	some	sense	of what she has sought from	us, and how she feels about us. Again, I am	describing categories	of	knowledge.	We	don't	need	to	know	everything	in	a	category,	so	there	is no	implication	that	we	need	to	know	everything	(or	even	most)	of	what	others	feel about	us.	But	to	be	completely	off-base	about	such	facts	in	relation	to	an	important person in our life, does seem to count as an instance of failing to know "the significant	facts	about	one's	life." Yet another aspect of life knowledge is knowing how your own projects, goals, concerns	etc.	have (or	have	not)	been realized in the	world, as	well as	why this	is	so.	This	kind	of	life	knowledge-knowing	and	understanding	one's	successes and failures-typically also requires a person to situate her knowledge in some larger	picture	of	the	society	she	lives	in	and	the	time	period	she	inhabits. It	seems impossible	to	say	how	much	such	contextual	knowledge	a	person	would	need.	Yet	it Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 18 is hard to imagine that someone lacking awareness of all such contextual details could	count	as	having	significant	life	knowledge. And,	of	course,	much	more	could	be	said,	both	in	the	way	of	adding	categories and	refining	the	ones	so	far	listed. Someone might worry about PVK, given that certain kinds of false beliefs about	the	self	are	extremely	common.	Psychologists	have	maintained	for	some	time that	most	people	hold	exaggeratedly	positive	beliefs	about	themselves,	their	ability to	exert	control	over	their	lives,	and	about	the	future.18	Not	only	are	these	positive illusions	pervasive,	and	so	completely	normal,	but	there	is	much	evidence	that	they are	highly	adaptive	as	well.19	In	other	words,	certain	distorted	beliefs	appear	to	have greater	prudential	value	than	true	beliefs. However,	what	the	psychological	findings	suggest	is	that	certain	false	beliefs have prudential value of the instrumental sort, whereas PVK is a thesis about intrinsic value. Moreover, it seems that these common self distortions have instrumental value (as opposed to the delusions characteristic of mental illness, which	do	not)	only	because	they	(1)	co-exist	well	with	other	correct	beliefs,	and	(2) are	responsive	to	environmental	feedback.20 Common	self	delusions	can	co-exist	with	correct	beliefs,	because	they	do	not depart from	reality entirely, but rather	exaggerate the real in a	positive	direction. For	example,	a	person	who	is	moderately	funny	may	view	himself	as	very	funny,	but will not typically see himself as a patient person if, in fact, he lacks patience altogether.	Most	important	of	all,	common	self-delusions	are	responsive	to	feedback, even though this is still no guarantee of accuracy. For example, someone	with an exaggeratedly positive sense of his own wit will revise his view of himself downward when confronted with clear evidence that others do not see him as 18 S. E. Taylor, Positive Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 6. 19 Ibid, ch. 2. 20 Ibid, 123-43. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 19 funny.	But	since	his	original	starting	point	was	exaggerated,	his	revised	view,	though less	flattering,	may	still	not	be	fully	accurate. The simplest answer to the	worry is that we are concerned	with intrinsic welfare value, and these beliefs have, at best, instrumental value. There is no contradiction in maintaining that positive illusions have intrinsic disvalue, even though	they	also	have	positive	instrumental	value.	However,	this	strikes	me	as	too simple. In its	simple form	PVK implies that	more	knowledge is	always	better than less.	But	a	modification	here	may	be	plausible in its	own	right	and	help to	explain my sense that positive illusions are often entirely harmless. What has intrinsic welfare value is having significant life knowledge-a picture of one's life that is accurate,	covers	all the	main	categories,	and is fairly	rich in	details.	Significant life knowledge is thus a threshold concept	with a fairly high threshold. For someone who	already	counts	as	possessing	significant	life	knowledge-someone	who	has	met the threshold conditions-we should say that acquiring additional knowledge is value	neutral.	For	many	people	then,	if	their	positive	illusions	form	a	relatively	small part	of their total set	of	personal	beliefs, and if they	are	otherwise	well-informed, their	illusions	need	not	detract	from	their	welfare. §3.2 Do	We	Really	Need	Knowledge? From	a	certain	perspective	it	is	natural	to	assume	that	knowledge	is	what	matters, particularly	since	in	ordinary	life	we	talk	rather	loosely	about	knowledge,	as	if	all	of our	true	beliefs	have	this	status.	Yet	there	are	other	epistemic	relations,	such	as	true belief (TB) and justified true belief (JTB), which	might also matter prudentially. Moreover, we should be open to the possibility that from the standpoint of prudential	value,	TB	and	JTB	might	be	just	as	good	as	knowledge. It is helpful to distinguish here between epistemic value and prudential value.	The	relationships	between	these	two	are	complex,	and	it	is	only	by	carefully Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 20 untangling	them	that	we	can	hope	to	answer	our	question	about	prudential	value.	I shall	discuss	each	in	turn. In	the	realm	of	epistemic	value,	knowledge	is	the	supreme	value,	superior	to both	TB	and JTB. It	has this status	because, relative to	TB	and JTB, it	has	more	of what	matters	from	the	epistemic	point	of	view:	freedom	from	epistemic	luck.21	The traditional story about why true belief is not knowledge is that true belief could simply	be	the	result	of	luck.	For	example,	suppose	Mary	believes	that	her	project	has been	a	huge	success	because	she is the	kind	of	person	who	wants to	believe	good things	about	herself	and	will	believe	such	things	no	matter	what.	The	results	of	her efforts	only	become	obvious	at	a	point	when	Mary	herself	is	abroad	with	no	way	to get	any	updates	on	how	her	project	is	doing.	Still,	she	believes	things	are	going	well, and	in	this	case	she	turns	out	to	be	right.	We	would	hardly	say	that	she	knows	this. The	traditional	response	to	such	cases	was	to	analyze	knowledge	as	justified true	belief.	In	contemporary	epistemology	two	different	visions	of	what	justification might be have emerged, but there are problems with equating knowledge with justified true belief on either version. On the first view (JTBE), S is justified in believing	p	if,	"it	is	reasonable	or	rational,	from	S's	own	point	of	view,	to	take	p	to	be true."22	In other words, S is justified in believing p, if S's evidence uniquely and strongly supports	belief in	p.	Gettier type cases	have led	most	people to conclude that JTBE is	not	knowledge, again	because	of the	potential role for luck.23	Suppose Claire looks	at	a clock to see	what time it is	and forms the	correct	belief that it is 4pm. Unbeknownst to her, the clock she is looking at is broken and always says 4pm. She has good reason for her belief (clocks are usually good sources of information	about	the	time,	and	she	has	no	reason	not	to	trust	this	clock),	but	in	this case	the	truth	of	her	belief	is	a	mere	accident.	This	disqualifies	it	as	knowledge. 21 Steup, Matthias, "Epistemology," in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed. Edward N.Zalta (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/epistemology/. Section 1.1 22 Ibid, Section 1.1. 23 Gettier, Edmund, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23: (1963): 121-23. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 21 On the other more contemporary approach to justification (JTBR), S is justified in believing p if p originates from, "reliable cognitive processes or faculties."24	On this view, justification ensures that S's belief has a high objective probability of being true. But once again examples have called into question whether JTBR is really knowledge. Goldman's famous barn examples make this point.25	Suppose I am, unbeknownst to me, driving through barn-façade country where	most	of	what	look	like	barns	are	really	just	elaborate	barn	facades.	I	happen, however,	to	see	the	only	real	barn	in	the	area	and	develop	the	belief	that	I	am	seeing a	barn.	My	belief	is	true,	and	it	was	developed	through	a	reliable	cognitive	process (vision).	But	again	my	belief	seems	too	much	based	on	luck	to	count	as	knowledge. I	have	rehearsed	this	familiar	story	because	it	explains	the	natural	hierarchy of	epistemic	values	within	the	realm	of	epistemic	value. In this	realm,	what	matters intrinsically	is	reduced	reliance	on	luck.	Luck,	in	turn,	provides	a	natural	entry	point into	a	discussion	of	the	prudential	value	of	various	epistemic	goods.	To	begin	with,	if anything is true, it is that	TB	has instrumental	prudential	value.	Without	at least	a roughly	accurate	picture	of	our	world	we	could	not	achieve	other	intrinsic	welfare goods. Moreover, given the kinds of creatures we are and the kind of world we inhabit, our natural interest in true belief gives us a strong prudential reason to want to reduce the role of luck in our belief formation	processes. This prudential interest	in	reducing	luck	is	broad	based.	At	the	general	level	we	are	less	concerend about	any	particular	belief,	and	more	concerned	that	large	numbers	of	our	beliefs	be true over lengthy periods of time. Luck just is another word for the absence of reliability. The presence of luck indicates that	we cannot reasonably hope for the same	outcome	twice. These	considerations	explain	why the	natural	hierarchy	of	value	we find in the	realm	of	epistemic	value	is	not	mirrored	in	the	realm	of	prudential	value,	at	least insofar as	we focus	on	prudential instrumental value. In the case	of any	particular 24 Steup, Matthias, "Epistemology," Section 1.1. 25 Alvin Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge" The Journal of Philosophy 73: (1976): 771-91. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 22 true	belief	p,	there	is	no	greater	instrumental	prudential	value	if	p	is	also	justified	(in either sense) or if p qualifies as knowledge. Suppose I very much want to play professional	baseball	and	suppose that this is	not	an	unreasonable	hope	given	my talents and that playing professionally would in fact be good for me. I live in a remote	town	where	talent	scouts	never	visit,	but	I	get	a	not-to-be-repeated	chance to	travel	to	a	city	to	play in	a	statewide	"all-stars"	game	where	many	talent	scouts will	be.	My	coach	first	learns	of	this	chance,	but	he	is	drunk	at	the	time	and	writes down	the	wrong	date.	He	then	passes	this	on	to	me.	Later	in	the	day	the	wind	blows the	sheet	of	paper	out	of	my	hand,	and	I	must	simply	rely	on	my	vague	memory	of what	it	said.	I	misremember,	but	(by	fluke)	my	faulty	memory	of	what	was	written	is correct	about	the	date.	I	show	up,	play,	and	am	recruited.	In	this	case,	having	a	true belief	about	when	the	game	will	be	is	incredibly	instrumentally	important.	But	there is no greater instrumental value present in a slightly different story in	which	my belief about the date is justified (JTBE or JTBR) or in one where my belief is knowledge.	It	is	certainly	true	that	since	I	can't	possibly	hope	for	the	world	to	treat me	so	well	in	general,	I	have	strong	instrumental	reasons	for	wanting	more	reliable epistemic links to the world, and for trying to cultivate in myself a degree of epistemic	virtue.	But	in	any	given	case,	all	that	seems	to	matter	from	the	standpoint of	prudential	instrumental	value	is	having	TB. What	then	about	intrinsic	prudential	value? If	one	is	at	all	inclined	to	assign intrinsic	welfare	value to	epistemic	statuses, then it	seems	one	should,	at the	very least,	say	that	it	is	intrinsically	better	to	have	true	beliefs	than	false	beliefs.	But	is	it intrinsically	better	to	have	JTB	as	opposed	to	TB,	and	better	still	to	have	knowledge? I	suspect	not.	The	value	hierarchy	we	see	in	epistemology	reflects	our	concern	with epistemic luck. And I have argued that we have strong instrumental prudential reasons to be concerned with luck. But I doubt that epistemic luck makes an intrinsic welfare difference. Indeed, we find further support for this view if we consider	other	types	of	welfare	goods.	In	these	cases	too,	luck	seems	to	have	little	or no	impact	on	intrinsic	welfare	value.	It	doesn't	generally	matter	whether	we	obtain Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 23 welfare	goods	through	some	reliable	method	or	simply	by	luck.	What	matters	is	just that	we	attain	them. Consider a non-epistemic case. Suppose it would be intrinsically good for Rebecca	to	marry	George.	Let	us	suppose	that	this	is	grounded	in	the	fact	that	they are temperamentally	suited to	one	another,	and if they	were to	marry they	would have	a	wonderful life together,	supporting	each	other in	many	positive	ways.	Now consider two	possible stories. In story	one,	Rebecca	and	George	have	known	each other	for	a	long	time,	and	everyone	around	them	recognizes	what	a	good	fit	they	are for	each	other.	When	they	begin	to	date,	their	friends	are	very	happy	for	them	and expect	good	things.	They	grow	to	love	each	other,	and	no	one	is	surprised	when	they marry.	Their	marriage	is	a	great	one.	In	story	number	two,	Rebecca	and	George	do not know each other. Rebecca's parents	meet George and his family and come to believe he would be a good match for Rebecca. But Rebecca refuses even to be introduced	to	George,	resenting	what	she	sees	as	her	parents'	meddling.	She	makes plans	to	go	abroad	to	study	for	the	next	eight	years.	But	one	evening,	a	few	weeks before	she	is	supposed	to	leave,	she	runs	into	George	in	a	local	park	and	they	start	to talk.	She	is	surprised	to	discover	how	well	they	get	along.	She	has	a	change	of	heart, puts	off	her	plans	to	go	abroad,	and	starts	seeing	George.	Shortly	afterward	they	get married	and	their	marriage is	a	great	one. In the first	story	a	good	thing	comes	to Rebecca	in	a	straightforward	and	reliable	way,	while	in	the	second	story	it	is	a	fluke of	luck	that	it	comes	to	her	at	all.	Yet	this	hardly	seems	to	make	a	difference	to	our assessment of how well her life goes. All that matters prudentially is that she marries	George. In	a	similar	way, I think that from	the	standpoint	of	prudential	value,	what matters	intrinsically	is	true	belief.	JTB	and	knowledge	also	have	intrinsic	prudential value	because	they	include	true	belief.	But	my	claim	is	that	they	do	not	add	intrinsic value to true belief. Consider the miraculous case of Julia. Julia had a rich and interesting	life,	and	while	she	was	alive	she	had	true	beliefs	about	all	the	signifciant facts	of	this	life.	But	despite	having	such	a	large	set	of	true	beliefs,	all	of	these	beliefs Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 24 were	true	by	fluke.	This	is	why	her	life	was	miraculous.	She	was,	let	us	say,	the	most epistemically	lucky	person	ever	to	live.	Of	course, it is	hard	to	imagine	how	such	a case could come about. Given that many of her beliefs are about quite personal things	it	is	hard	to	imagine	how	she	could	have	had	a	large	number	of	such	beliefs that	were	both	true	and	yet	never	related	in	the	proper	way	to	her	evidence	(JTBE). Similarly, because she had so many true beliefs it is hard to imagine how the cognitive	processes	that	gave	rise	to	them	could	all	fail	to	be	reliable	(JTBR).	After	all, consistent truth as an outcome is normally good evidence for reliable cognitive processes	at	work.	So	it	is	indeed	hard	to	get	a	good	grip	on	a	case	of	someone	who has a large set of	merely true	beliefs.	Only	with some	hefty and	no	doubt bizarre science	fictions	could	we	make	it	work.	But	let	us	import	some	such	science	fiction	(I leave	it	to	the	reader	to	develop	one	she	likes).	Though	a	life	like	Julia's	is	an	unlikely reality,	we	can	still	ask	whether	it	was	lacking	a	degree	of	intrinsic	prudential	value in	virtue	of	its	epistemic	failings.	I	don't	see	how	it	is. Remember that,	unlike	someone in the	experience	machine,	everything	she believed	was	true.	The	world	was	a	certain	way,	and	Julia	had	an	acurate	picture	of how	it	was.	For	example,	when	alive,	she	believed	that	she loved	Charles, that	she had been married to him for years, and had traveled the world with him. She believed they both enjoyed their African travels the most, that they both loved unusual	scenery	and	gourmet	food,	and	that	they	had	enjoyed	these	things	together on	many	occasions.	She	also	believed	that	Charles	loved	her,	and	that	he	appreciated her	best features. Since	her	beliefs	were true, she really	did travel the	world	with Charles and so forth. He really did love her, and really did appreciate her best features. In	short,	her life	contained	valuable	actions	and	happenings,	and	she	was aware of these. I find it hard to believe that the further removal of reliance on epistemic	luck	would	have	made	her	life	intrinsically	better	for	her.	As	she	was	living this life, it	would	have	made	sense	for	anyone	concerned	about	her	to	want	her	to have reliable epistemic access to truth (which she didn't have). But that desire Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 25 makes sense, given that no one outside bizarre philosophy examples can rely on epistemic	luck.26 I have not yet committed	myself to the idea that any epistemic status has intrinsic	welfare	value,	though	I	find	the	idea	intuitively	plausible.	What	I	have	done is	suggest	that	insofar	as	one	is	inclined	to	explore	this	territory,	one	should	agree that true belief has immense instrumental prudential value.	Moreover, because of this,	epistemic	virtue	and	a	reliable	epistemic	connection	to	reality	have	instrumental prudential value. JTB and knowledge, however, have no additional instrumental prudential value over and above true belief. And when we turn to questions of intrinsic	prudential value, I suggest	we should say the same. If epistemic statuses have intrinsic prudential welfare value, then TB has such value. But JTB and knowledge are not superior to TB in intrinsic prudential value. They have equal intrinsic prudential value to TB, because they are themselves instances of true belief. Despite the fact that my preferred version of PVK has turned out to be a thesis about true belief, for the rest of the paper I will continue to talk about knowledge.	In	ordinary	speech	it	is	actually	quite	hard	to	substitute	"true	belief"	for all the ordinary references to knowledge. I shall also for the sake of continuity continue to use PVK as the label for the thesis, though a	more accurate acronym would	be	PVTB. §3.3 What	Should	We	Ultimately	Say	About	PVK? 26 No doubt many readers will not be fully persuaded that TB is as good as JTB. I confess I have struggled with this myself. However, I have ultimately come to think that what matters prudentially is simply having an accurate picture of reality. Interestingly, Nozick in The Examined Life, (106) suggests that knowledge is important because the kind of contact with reality we want is one in which we are tracking reality. Many readers might feel the same though be willing to settle for JTB. However, Nozick's point is ambiguous. Why suppose that only knowledge or JTB involve tracking reality? After all, if you go through life with all true beliefs, then even if this happened by luck there is still a sense in which you were tracking reality (your tracking was merely a matter of luck, but you were tracking reality since your beliefs continuously adjusted to the world). Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 26 Should	a	theorist	of	well-being	try	to	incorporate	something	like	this	revised	version of	PVK?	And if so, can a subjectivist theory accomplish this, or	would adoption	of PVK	push	us	towards	an	objective	theory? If one is sympathetic to	PVK then it is clear that current	versions	of	desire theory	won't do. For they claim that personal knowledge is only important	when desired. Even if many people in fact want to know about their lives, presumably some	do	not.	However,	it	may	seem	to	run	counter	not	just	to	desire	theory	but	to subjectivism	more generally to insist that personal knowledge	has intrinsic value. An	objective	theorist	doesn't	have	this	problem. It	seems	to	me,	however,	that	there	are	certain	moves	open	to	desire	theory that	might	allow	one	to	accommodate	PVK.	And	whether	or	not	the	revised	theory	is one	that	desire	theorists	would	willingly	recognize	as	a	variety	of	their	own	view,	it would	clearly	be	a form	of subjectivism.	The first step is to recognize	some	of the ways in which personal knowledge differs from other kinds of substantive prudential goods. Personal knowledge is knowledge of (and knowledge related to) the things we care about. Arguably, however, part of what it is to care about something	is	wanting	to	know	about	it.	Caring	is	a	complicated	attitude,	but	at	least part	of	concern	for	X	is	the	desire	to	know	X:	to	see	it,	or	appreciate	it,	or	know	that it	is.	And	another	part	of	caring	about	X	is	caring	what	happens	to	X,	and	this	in	turn makes	one	want	to	know	how	things	stand	with	X,	what	is	happening	in	the	vicinity of	X	and	so	on. Indeed,	to	lack	all	concern	for	the	facts	about	X	is	good	evidence	for	a lack	of	concern	about	X. Now this suggests a	way to argue that, in fact, people do quite universally want to know about the things that matter most to them and which affect their welfare.	Of	course,	it	may	not	be	a	desire	they	recognize	having.	A	person	may	only have	the	desire	in	the	sense	that	she	possesses	certain	unconscious	dispositions.	But that	is	enough.	A	desire	does	not	have	to	be	conscious	for	a	desire	theorist	to	appeal to it. It is also true that	many	people	will be conflicted, also	possessing conscious desires not to know certain kinds of facts. Suppose I devote much time to a Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 27 particular project. On the view under consideration my genuine concern for the project	entails	that	I	desire	to	know	about	it.	So	the	modified	desire	theory	could	say knowledge	about	the	project	is	intrinsically	good	for	me.	Yet	I	may	now	suspect	that it has not gone so	well and, fearing confrontation	with	my failure, I	may actively desire	not	to	know how the	project turns	out.	Thus the theory	would	also	have to allow	that	not	knowing	is	also	good.	The	reality	of	conflicted	desires	means	that	in many	cases	knowledge	would	be	both	prudentially	good	and	prudentially	bad,	and the	net	value	of	knowing	would	depend	on	many	details	of	the	case.	If	one	wants	to adopt	a	pure	form	of	PVK	where	personal	knowledge	is	always	an	unalloyed	good, this	would	not	appeal.	But	I	actually	find	the	pure	form	too	simplistic.	It	seems	right to	me that in	many cases the value of personal knowledge is a complex question with	reasons	pointing	in	different	diretions.	So	if	this	kind	of	subjectivist	view	could be	made to	work, I	would	not see that	particular feature	of it as	problematic.	The view	would	still	have	an	advantage	over	current	desire	theory	in	that	it	would	allow us	to	see	personal	knowledge	as	having	presumptive	intrinsic	welfare	value. However	there	is	one	further	kind	of	case	that	theorists	of	either	persuasion should	take	seriously	and	that	seems	to	pose	a	problem	for	desire	theory	even	in	the revised	version	I	have	sketched.	The	original	problem	was	that	there	might	be	cases where	intuitively	personal	knowledge	counts	as	a	good	but	where	a	subject	doesn't desire	it.	I	think	there	are	also	cases	where,	intuitively,	knowledge	is	not	good,	but where the subject does desire it. These are cases where learning something is psychologically devastating. Many types of news might make us less than fully happy, but this doesn't seem to count against the idea that knowledge might be intrinsically	good.	What	I	have	in	mind	are	extreme	cases. L.W. Sumner	describes	a case that	might-depending	on	how	we fill in the psychic	details-count.	Consider	the	case	of	Asta,	whose	son	has	been	killed	in	war. She	wants for it to	be true that	he	did	not suffer, but she	also	wants to	know the Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 28 truth	whatever	it	may	be.27	Eventually	she	learns	both	that	he	suffered	greatly	and many	of	the	grisly	details	of	his	suffering	and	death.	She	is	devastated	by	what	she learns,	forever	altered,	forever	haunted	by	the	images	created	for	her	by	the	soldier who	tells	her	the	truth.	I	do	not	know	the	details	of	how	Asta's	story	continues.	But there is a plausible continuation of Asta's story in which she is psychically undermined	by this	news.	Yet it also seems	plausible to	me that some individuals might	want	such	news,	and	might	want	it	even	knowing	what	it	will	do	to	them.	Our desire	to	know	can	be	deep	and	in	such	cases	can	be	our	undoing.	Of	course,	I	don't mean	to	imply	that	all	cases	of	bad	news	are	alike.	There	may	be	people	who	could learn	what	Asta	learns	and	yet	have	their	happiness	only	temporarily	blighted.	The real issue is about the long-term psychic effects on the individual-the extent to which	knowledge	of	certain	facts	can	cause	suffering.	I	think	knowledge	that	causes suffering	cannot	count	as	good for	a	person	even if she	wants it.	Subjectivists	and objectivists	alike	will	have	to	find	a	way	to	limit	PVK	in	such	cases. §4.0	Conclusion I have argued that there is more than way to go beyond the mental. I have distinguished between two broad types of claims, which I labeled MIE and PVK respectively-both	suggested	by	traditional	examples	like	the	experience	machine. Each of these is really, in turn, a placeholder for a number of views one might develop	about	(a)	how	facts	in	the	world	contribute	to	welfare	and	(b)	how	positive epistemic	relations	do.	I	remain	ambivalent	about	MIE	and	its	cousin	CVE,	but	I	find PVK intuitively plausible. Yet, I am also drawn to subjectivist views, and it is not entirely clear that a revised desire theory (or some other subjective theory) can easily incorporate PVK. Objective theories have no problems of this sort- objectivists	are	free	to	pick	and	choose	among	the	theses	I	have	described.	However, there	are	other	disadvantages	to	being	an	objectivist	about	well-being.	Sadly,	there 27 This story is cited by L.W. Sumner, Welfare, 96-7. Published	In:	Oxford	Studies	in	Normative	Ethics	Volume	4.	Edited	Mark	Timmons,	Oxford University	Press	(2015),	210-235. 29 is	no	space to	work	out	all	of these	matters	here.	But I	hope to	have	opened	up	a new, hopefully exciting area of inquiry for theorists of well-being and to have at least	laid	the	groundwork	for	the	development	in	the	future	of	my	own	considered view.